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STATUTE GRANTING TAX DEDUCTION FOR TUITION PAID BY
PARENTS OF SECTARIAN AND NONSECTARIAN SCHOOL
CHILDREN DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Mueller v. Allen, 676 F. 2d 1198 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3253 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-195)
In Mueller v. Allen' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit appears to have departed from the precedents of the
Supreme Court by upholding, against a first amendment establishment
clause2 challenge, a Minnesota tax benefit package3 containing a per-
sonal income tax deduction for tuition4 paid by parents of private as
well as public school children.
A group of Minnesota taxpayers5 brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota against the state tax com-
missioner and intervening taxpayers in order to challenge a statute6
which provides school-related personal income tax deductions for the
1. 676 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-195).
2. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
3. See infra note 6.
4. See infra note 7.
5. The original suit was brought by five individual plaintiffs on behalf of the taxpayers of
Minnesota. Through application of the res judicata doctrine, the court dismissed three of the
plaintiffs when it found they had had an interest in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer,
452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978), a case decided three years earlier in which the same statute
was challenged. Because Roemer was not a representative taxpayers' suit, the Mueller court re-
fused to dismiss the two remaining plaintiffs. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 999 (D. Minn.
1981).
6. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09 (West Supp. 1982) allows the following deductions from
gross income in computing net income:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed
$500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to 12,
for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary
or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, Iowa or Wisconsin, wherein a
resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is
not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall mean and include
books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secon-
dary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public ele-
mentary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and
materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of
which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall it include such books or
materials for, or transportation to, extracurricular activities including sporting events,
musical or dramatic events, speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar
nature.
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parents of dependent elementary and secondary students. Plaintiffs
charged that because the deductions applied to tuition,7 transporta-
tion,8 and textbook9 expenses arising from a sectarian private educa-
tion, the statute promoted the establishment of religion. 10 In addition,
plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated the free exercise clause,"
which was made applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 2
The district court, finding the statute neutral on its face and in its
ultimate impact, rejected the establishment clause challenge.' 3  The
7. The district court found tuition to include regular full-time tuition, some summer school
tuition, special tuition for students attending public schools in another district, tuition for private
remedial tutorial services, tuition for school-provided instruction of students whose physical
handicaps prevent them from attending regular classes, tuition for Montessori School, and tuition
for driver education offered within the school curriculum. 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D. Minn.
1981).
8. Transportation includes the cost of transporting all students who are not eligible for free
transportation because they attend school outside their home districts or who do not live the re-
quired distances from their schools. Also included are those who live in school districts that pro-
vide no free transportation. Id.
9. The textbook provision encompasses the cost of secular textbooks and secular equipment,
including gym shoes and suits for physical education class; rental fees for cameras, ice skates,
calculators and musical instruments for class; art supplies, metals or woods and home economics
materials to meet minimum fine and industrial arts class requirements; and pencils and special
notebooks for class. Id.
10. Id. at 999. See supra note 2.
11. 514 F. Supp. at 999.
The free exercise clause follows the establishment clause and states: "Congress shall make no
law... prohibiting the free exercisie [of religion]." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Usually, individuals
challenging legislation on free exercise grounds seek exemption from a law that appears facially
neutral but which in practice adversely affects those individuals because of their religious prac-
tices. See, ag., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting Amish children from compul-
sory school attendance); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (striking down a state
unemployment compensation law requiring sabbatarians to accept Saturday work or lose bene-
fits); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (rejecting request by Jewish
merchant for exemption from Sunday closing laws). See generally L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 812 (1978) (tracing the incorporation of the first amendment religion clauses);
Kauper, The Warren Court: Religlous Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REv. 269
(1968) (discussing the early applications of the religion clauses to state law).
12. See Illinois exrel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (applying free exer-
cise clause to states); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying establishment clause
to state); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (dicta supporting application of free exer-
cise clause to states).
13. The district court admitted that the inclusion of both private and public school children,
an apparently neutral classification, does not preclude an inquiry into the factual breadth of the
classification. 514 F. Supp. at 1002. In the instant case, however, it found that the statistics of-
fered by the plaintiffs as proof of a primary impact on sectarian institutions ineffective because of
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court granted defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. 14
Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, which affirmed the decision and held: Although the statute
covers expenses incurred at religiously affiliated schools, it has a valid
secular purpose in the promotion of quality education. 5 In addition,
because the primary effect of the statute is neither the advancement nor
inhibition of religion,' 6 it does not violate the establishment clause.' 7
The religion clauses'8 of the first amendment guarantee individual
freedom from governmental intrusion into religious life.' 9 Historically,
James Madison2" and Thomas Jefferson2' promoted free exercise and
the exclusion of figures representing at least two million dollars in annual tuition paid to Minne-
sota public schools. Id. As a consequence, the court pronounced the statute neutral. Id.
The district court also discounted the free exercise argument because plaintiffs failed to prove
an infringement of their own religious beliefs. Id. at 1003.
14. Id.
15. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982).
16. Id. at 1205.
17. The Eighth Circuit did not address the free exercise challenge. Id. at 1198. For an expla-
nation of the free exercise clause and a challenge based on it, see supra note 12.
18. See supra notes 2 & 12.
19. See generally Kauper, The Walz Decisiorn More on the Religion Clauses of the First
A4mendment, 69 MICH. L. REv. 179 (1970) (promoting and protecting religious liberty as general
purpose of both clauses); Mercel, The Protection of Individual Choice: .4 Consential Understanding
of Religion Under the First .4mendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805 (1975) (both clauses ensuring
freedom of choice despite often conflicting interpretations).
20. Madison viewed separation of church and state as essential for the freedom and security
of both institutions. See, e.g., Hunt, James Madison andReligious Liberty, 1 AM. HIST. ASS'N REP.
165 (1961); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 9 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978). In
1786, Madison issued his "Memorial and Remonstrance" in denunciation of "A Bill Establishing
a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion," an assessment bill introduced to the General
Assembly of Virginia. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947). The bill was designed to
replace the general tithe abolished in 1777 with general tax revenues to support religious institu-
tions. Id. at 36 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Although the final form of the legislation gave an
individual taxpayer the option of applying the contribution to education rather than to a particu-
lar church, Madison would not relent and wrote:
Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest
lustre; those of every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil pol-
icy .... Such a government will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the
enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his
property....
2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Hunt ed. 1900), quoted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 67-68 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See generally G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THEORY 194-95 (rev. ed. 1950) (discussing the forerunner of eighteenth century separatist thought,
Pope Gelasius I, and his "two sword" theory).
21. When the Virginia Assembly defeated "A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of
the Christian Religion," see supra note 20, it adopted Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 12. In contrast to Madison, Jefferson sup-
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nonestablishment 22 of religion as inseparable concepts. 23 In the past
thirty-five years, however, the Supreme Court has frequently reviewed
them independently,24 focusing on cases involving the relationship be-
tween nonestablishment and education.25
In 1947,26 the Court adopted the first tier in modem establishment
clause analysis, the secular purpose test of Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion.27 The challenged New Jersey statute28 in Everson prescribed free
bus transportation29 for children in private and public schools. Writing
for the majority,30 Justice Black reasoned that only a strict policy of no-
aid3' to parochial education could preserve the original meaning32 of
ported the separation of church and state because he feared ecclesiastical corruption of the state.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 814. In Jefferson's words, the perfect relationship between religion
and civil government is "a wall of separation." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to The Danbury
Baptist Association (January 1, 1802), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113
(Washington ed. 1861).
22. Because the establishment clause is prohibitive, commentators often refer to it as the
nonestablishment principle. See, e.g., Kurland, Politics and the Constitution: Federal Aid to Paro-
chial Schools, I LAND & WATER L. REV. 475, 492 (1966). Both phrases will be used in this
Comment.
23. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 814. Tribe stated that the framers of the religion clauses
viewed them as "at least compatible and at best mutually supportive." Id.
24. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (considering the
establishment clause alone in tuition tax deduction challenge). But see Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (commenting on the paradox of
subordinating one clause to the other). See generally Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968) (noting the Supreme Court's tendency to
consider one of the religion clauses while excluding the other).
25. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973).
26. Between 1798 and 1947, the nonestablishment principle generated little case law. See,
e.g., Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (approving state loan of textbooks to
nonpublic schools because of the public purpose); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (up-
holding use of monies held in Indian trust funds by the federal government for payment of tuition
to parochial schools on reservations because of the private nature of the funds); Bradfield v, Rob-
erts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (allowing federal funds to be used for the expansion of a hospital oper-
ated by a religious order because the purpose of the institution not religious).
27. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
28. N.J. REv. STAT. § 18-14.8 (Cum. Supp. 1944) (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A-
39.1 (West 1968)).
29. The statute allowed local school boards to make contracts with bus companies for the
transportation of students to nonprofit, nonpublic schools. 330 U.S. at 3. This arrangement led to
a board of education resolution authorizing the reimbursement of the parents of children in public
and Catholic schools for transportation expenses. Id
30. Justice Douglas would later voice regret at having voted with the 5-4 Everson majority.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443-44 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
31. Justice Black stated that the Constitution forbids the state to pass laws that aid one reli-
gion, all religions, or that show a preference for one religion over another. 330 U.S. at 15. Despite
that pronouncement, the Court has never followed a strict no-aid policy. Five years after Everson
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/7
Number 1] TAX DEDUCTION FOR TUITION
the establishment clause. Nonetheless, incidental benefits to religious
institutions are permissible if the legislation encompasses a valid secu-
lar purpose.33 Applying this test, the Court held that legislation ensur-
ing the safe delivery of children to and from school had a public
welfare34 rather than religious goal; consequently, the program was
permissible.35
For sixteen years after Everson, the Court searched for valid secular
purposes36 as it struggled with the first amendment consequences of
Justice Douglas wrote: "The First Amendment. . . does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
See generally Kauper, supra note 19, at 180 (asserting that in the Court's eyes, complete separation
is impossible).
32. The Court sought to adhere to the original meaning of the clause as envisioned by
Madison and Jefferson. See generally supra notes 21 & 22 (discussing the positions of Madison
and Jefferson). Thus, it determined that a strict nonestablishment theory prohibits a state from
setting up a church or passing laws to aid one or more churches. The state may not influence
individuals to go to or remain away from a church. Moreover, a state may not punish individuals
for religious involvement, levy taxes to support religious activities, or participate in the affairs of a
church organization. 330 U.S. at 15-16. But see P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION
49 (1964) (discounting the applicability of Madison's and Jefferson's theories to contemporary
conflicts between nonestablishment and education because the eighteenth century supporters of
separation were addressing the problem of direct governmental support of the ecclesiastical
establishment).
33. 330 U.S. at 17-18.
34. The public welfare rationale retains some vitality as the "child benefit" theory. Gian-
nella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L. RE. 513, 576
(1968). Under this theory, a state may provide educational benefits to the individual pupil, but
not directly to the school. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). The Wolman Court ap-
proved the loan of textbooks, tests, therapeutic and diagnostic services, but disapproved the loan
of equipment and materials for instruction, and reimbursement for field trip transportation. Id
The fine distinctions in what actually benefits the child, drawn by the Wolman Court, suggests the
unpursuasiveness of the theory. See Hunter, The Continuing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 523, 542-44 (1980). See also id at 529 (discussing the narrow applicability
of the "child benefit" theory in light of Douglas' reversal of his Everson position); supra note 30.
35. The Court warned that with its acceptance of the New Jersey statute it had approached
the "verge" of constitutionality. 330 U.S. at 17-18.
36. During this period, the Court determined whether a statute had a secular purpose in three
ways. See Note, Establishment Clause Analysir of Legislative andAdministrativeAidto Religion, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1974). First, it examined the legislative decisionmaking process to
determine the influence of sectarian lobbying efforts. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws supported secular, as well as sectarian interests). Second, the
Court searched the statutory provisions for the required use of a strictly religious instrumentality.
See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down required Bible
reading in public schools). Third, it considered public interpretation of the legislative purpose.
See. e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (voiding state statute forbidding the teaching
of evolution in public schools after consulting law review articles, letters to newspaper editors, and
advertising campaigns to determine popular perception of legislative motive).
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Sunday closing laws,37 released time arrangements38 on 39 and oflO
public school premises, and prayer recitation in public schools. 41
When lawmakers began supplying clearly religious legislation with
statements of secular purpose,42 the Court avoided breaching the defer-
ence usually paid a collateral branch of the government43 by adding a
second level to the establishment clause inquiry: the primary effect test.
First applied in Abington School District v. Schempp," the primary
effect test arose from an establishment clause challenge to Bible read-
ing and prayer recitation in public schools. The primary effect test de-
mands that the principal consequences of a law neither positively nor
negatively bear on religion.45 Therefore, although a statute has a pur-
ported secular purpose, as in Schempp, 46 courts may invalidate it if it
betrays government neutrality47 by advancing or inhibiting religious
37. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws because
of the secular value of reserving a day for rest).
38. A released time arrangement allows a public school district to set aside hours in a week
for release of pupils who want religious instruction, but have no access to full time sectarian
schooling. See Giannella, supra note 34, at 570.
39. See Illinois exrel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating release
time program with religious instruction on public school property).
40. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Writing for the majority in Zorach, Justice
Douglas justified approval of releasing public school children for religion classes outside the pub-
lic school premises by asserting that Americans are "a religious people" who want to encourage
the free practice of religion. Id at 313. Compare Giannella, supra note 34, at 531 (criticizing theCourt for being too accommodating) with Kauper, supra note 12, at 269 (praising the Court for
striking a realistic balance between free exercise and establishment).
41. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting ecumenical prayer in public school
classrooms).
42. See Note, supra note 36, at 1179.
43. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (placing great weight
on decisions of Congress and experience of FCC in evaluating "equal time" dispute); O'Gorman
& Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins., Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931) (Court trusting state's judgment on
matter clearly within police power in insurance rate suit).
44. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
45. Id. at 222.
46. The statute in Schempp prescribed Bible reading to promote moral values and teach liter-
ature. Id. at 223.
47. Neutrality is the essence of the primary effect test; however, strict neutrality has never
been followed by the Court. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(Jehovah's Witnesses excused from school flag ceremony). The Court accepts, instead, a "benevo-
lent neutrality" view which allows accommodation of some religious practices to avoid destruction
of the free exercise principle. See, e.g., Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 291 (D.C. Cir.), cer.
denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972) (dicta in case involving compulsory chapel attendance at military
academy). See also supra notes 36-38. See generally Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1680 (1969) (general discussion of neutrality and nonestablishment); Note, supra
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practice.48
The purpose and effect test stood unaltered until 197041 when the
Supreme Court, in Walz v. Tax Commission5" denied an establishment
clause challenge to the tax exempt status conferred by the New York
Constitution on church property.5 The Walz Court stated three main
reasons for its holding. First, the Court explained that state and federal
history52 supported the acceptance of such an exemption. Second, be-
cause the religious institutions represented only a small percentage of
the law's beneficiaries,53 the promotional effect on religion was inconse-
quential.54 Third, repeal of the exemption would force the government
to conduct audits and property assessments on church premises, thus
increasing contact between church and state beyond the limits of
nonestablishment5 5 Concern with the last element, excessive entangle-
ment between church and state, 56 represented a third step in subse-
note 36 (discussing army chaplaincy program as example ofstrict neutrality giving way to benevo-
lent neutrality).
48. For a discussion of the factors considered by the Court in determining whether the nature
of a particular aid program, or the religious permeation of the recipient institution will have a
primary effect that inhibits or advances religion, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
49. The only significant establishment clause case in the last half of the Schempp decade was
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In411en, the Court relied primarily upon the secular
purpose test and "child benefit" rationale of Everson to validate a state loan of secular textbooks
to sectarian school pupils. Id See supra notes 31, 32 & 34 (discussing the Everson logic).
50. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
5 1. N.Y. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1. The New York statute that activated the constitutional provi-
sion stated in pertinent part:
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral
or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, be-
nevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific, liter-
ary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, historical, or cemetery purposes
. . . used exclusively for. . . such purposes. . . shall be exempt from taxation ....
N.Y. PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1) (Consol. 1981).
52. The federal government and every state grant churches a property tax exemption pat-
terned after a Virginia statutory scheme adopted in 1800. 397 U.S. at 676-77.
53. The provision also exempted all property devoted to nonprofit educational facilities and
charitable organizations. See supra note 51. Chief Justice. Burger stated that in granting an ex-
emption for church property, the legislature did not single out "one particular church, or religious
group or even churches as such." 397 U.S. at 672-73. Moreover, religious property represented a
single member in "a broad class of property owned by nonprofit quasi-public corporations." Id.
54. According to Chief Justice Burger, the benefits flowing to the religious institution must be
more than "incidental" and remote to fail the primary effect test. Id. at 676. "There is no genuine
nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion." Id. at 675.
55. Id. at 674.
56. Three years after Walz, the Court invalidated a program not only because it promised to
entangle church and state in complicated administrative procedures, but because annual appropri-
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quent establishment clause analyses. 7
By coupling the primary effect inquiry with the excessive entangle-
ment inquiry, the Court invalidated various attempts to aid parochial
elementary and secondary schools." The Court has invalidated reim-
bursement for the administration of teacher-prepared tests, graded by
sectarian personnel but mandated by the state;59 appropriation of funds
for auxiliary services60 for pupils; salary supplements for teachers of
secular subjects in religious schools; 6t loans of secular instructional
materials;62 and funds for field trip transportation.63 The Supreme
Court's reasoning in these cases has often been perplexingly circular. A
ation debates would immerse the state in heated church-related political debates as well. See
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971). The Court treated the second concern, fear of
extensive political entanglement, as separate from administrative entanglement in the Lemon case.
See Note, supra note 36, at 1189. Two years later, the Court downgraded the political entangle-
ment test, stating that it could be considered a warning sign of excessive administrative entangle-
ment, but "may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws." Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973).
The Court declared the combined entanglement test to be on a coequal basis with the secular
purpose and primary effect tests two years after Lemon. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ.,
413 U.S. 472 (1973). Nonetheless, Lemon remains the only decision after Walz to address admin-
istrative entanglement without connecting it to the primary effect test. See Hunter, supra note 34,
at 533 (a disparaging discussion of the "bootstrapping" effect of such a pairing). Thus, although
the Court discusses entanglement extensively, its value as an independent test is questionable. See
generally Underwood, Permissible Entanglement Under the Establishment Clause, 25 EMORY L.J.
17, 19 (1976) (criticizing Court for inconsistency in using excessive entanglement analysis); Note,
supra note 36, at 1188 (labeling the entanglement inquiry the least useful of the three nonestab-
lishment tests).
57. For an earlier suggestion of an excessive entanglement criterion, see Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. The Court subjects aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools to a higher level of
scrutiny than aid to sectarian colleges and universities. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (disallowing a state grant to church-afftliated elementary and secon-
dary schools for the repair and maintenance of secular buildings) with Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (approving state grants to sectarian colleges for the erection of secular class-
rooms). See generally Hunter, supra note 34, at 529 ("Any proposal for public assistance to pri-
vate schools below the college level which does not exclude assistance to sectarian schools...
carries... a presumption of constitutional invalidity").
Chief Justice Burger supported the distinction because the lower levels of parochial education
are an "integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 616 (1971). Funding for the secular elements of a religious college is analogous to gov-
ernment funding of a church-affiliated hospital, because neither institution has "indoctrination" as
its goal. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Greenawalt, Education in a Democ-
racy: Financial Support ofPrivate, Public and Parochial Schools, 3 HuM. R'rs. 17 (1973).
59. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
60. Eg., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
61. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
62. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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program may be rejected if it includes no auditing procedure to ensure
the continued nonreligious use of granted materials,64 thus failing the
secular purpose test. On the other hand, if a detailed audit is required
by the legislation, according to the Walz rationale it may demand too
much government surveillance, and thus offend the excessive adminis-
trative entanglement test.65
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court upheld a series of aid
programs only vaguely distinguishable on the facts from those disap-
proved earlier.66 Among the provisions approved were reimbursement
to private schools for the cost of providing auxiliary services,67 admin-
istration of state prepared and graded tests,68 and maintenance of state-
mandated records. 69 The inconsistencies of the Burger Court in deter-
mining the boundaries of nonestablishment in private education have
prompted both supportive70 and critical7' commentary from the judici-
ary. In the area of financial aid to parents with children in nonpublic
schools, however, the Court has been uncharacteristically consistent.
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Committeefor Public Education v. Ny-
63. E.g., McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., 446 U.S. 970 (1980);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
64. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
65. See supra note 58.
66. See generally Note, Rebuilding the Wall- The Casefor a Return to the Strict Interpretation
of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1981) (comprehensively discussing the Bur-
ger Court's willingness to make distinctions on "narrow factual grounds").
67. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974) (requiring federal funding of special pro-
grams for deprived children pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a, 244, regardless of the ideological na-
ture of the school attended), modfed, 422 U.S. 1004 (1975).
Although the Wheeler Court did not address the first amendment issue, three justices did recog-
nize a problem in providing services to private students. Such programs were invalidated in Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402,428 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 429 (White, J., concur-
ring). id. at 429 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
69. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
70. Writing for the majority in Regan, Justice Powell admitted that the Court's decisions
sacrifice "clarity and predictability for flexibility." Id. at 662. Powell argued, however, that no
"litmus-paper test" distinguishing "permissible from impermissible aid to religiously oriented
schools" would be available until the courts and states produce "a single, more encompassing
construction of the Establishment Clause." Id.
71. Justice Stevens implored the Court to stop its attempts to justify "various subsidies to
nonpublic schools. . . [riather than continuing with the sisyphean task of trying to patch together
the 'blurred, indistinct and variable barrier'" between church and state. Id. at 671 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
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quist7  applied the secular purpose,7 3 primary effect, 74 and excessive
entanglement 75 criteria to a challenge of a New York educational aid
program.76 The challenged legislation provided income tax deduc-
tions77 for the tuition expenses of parents with children in private
schools. Although a statement78 incorporated into the statute survived
scrutiny under the secular purpose test, the legislation failed at the pri-
mary effect level. The Court readily agreed with the district court's
79
view that the direct grant80 and tuition reimbursement8' provisions vio-
lated the establishment clause. Contrary to the district court, however,
the Supreme Court concluded that the tax deduction plan encouraged
parents to send their children to private schools, 82 the majority of
which are church affiliated.83 As a result, religious institutions84 were
effectively, and thus prohibitively, supported.8 5 Failure at the second
72. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
73. See supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
76. The program had three sections. The first provided direct grants to private schools in low
income areas for maintenance and repair of facilities. The second established a predetermined
tuition reimbursement for parents with a yearly income below $5000 who sent their children to
nonpublic schools. The third provision entitled parents who made between $5000 and $25,000
annually and who sent their children to private schools to deduct a stipulated amount from ad-
justed gross income in calculating their state income tax. 1972 N.Y. Laws 1693.
77. Although the amount was subtracted from the adjusted gross income before the computa-
tion of tax due, the Court found that the deduction operated as a "credit" because the statute
prescribed an amount unrelated to the actual tuition expense. Thus, the provision produced a
"tax 'forgiveness' in exchange for performing a specific act which the State desires to encourage."
413 U.S. at 789. The Court emphasized, however, that the label was unimportant. Id.
78. Id. at 764. The legislature sought to preserve the "vitality of our pluralistic society." Id.
79. 350 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
80. The Court reasoned that if the federal government is prohibited from giving sectarian
elementary and secondary schools funds for the erection of nonreligious buildings, it is also pre-
cluded from providing them funds for the maintenance of existing secular buildings. 413 U.S. at
777. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring) (unacceptability of
direct transfer of monies to religious institution); id. at 700 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (danger of
attempts by five states to directly subsidize private schools).
81. Tuition reimbursement to parents with children in private schools was given in addition
to the right to send their children to public schools totally at state expense. 413 U.S. at 788. See
also Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (invalidating grants of $90 per depen-
dent child in nonpublic school).
82. 413 U.S. at 791.
83. In New York, approximately 85% of the private elementary and secondary schools were
church affiliated at the time Walz was decided. Id. at 768.
84. The Court equated support of religious institutions, such as elementary and secondary
schools, with support of religion. Id at 788. See also supra note 58.
85. Although the tax benefit was given to parents the year following a tuition payment, the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/7
Number 1] TAX DEDUCTION FOR TUITION
tier of nonestablishment analysis precluded the need to conduct an ex-
cessive entanglement inquiry. Nonetheless, the Court noted that the
political divisiveness which the tax deduction could cause made it high-
ly suspect under a political entanglement inquiry. 6 Finally, the Court
discounted any comparisons with the issues surrounding the church
property tax exemption in Walz v. Tax Commission. 7
With one exception,"8 in the twelve years following Nyquist, courts
Court reasoned that the benefit still served as an incentive to keep one's child in a private school.
Thus, with the state's blessings, benefits flowed through the parents to the private school. 413 U.S.
at 793-94.
Justice Rehnquist disagreed. He contended that aid to individuals had always been on a differ-
ent footing from direct aid to religious institutions and that the state's only intention was to equal-
ize the costs to parents. Id. at 805 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
86. The Court believed that the state had a motive to escalate the initially modest package
and thus increase the potential for political entanglement. Justice Powell stated:
[W]e know from long experience with both Federal and State Governments that aid
programs of any kind tend. . . to escalate in cost, and to generate their own aggressive
constituencies.. . . [Tihe State itself, concededly anxious to avoid assuming the burden
of educating children now in private and parochial schools, has a strong motivation for
increasing this aid ...
Id. at 797.
87. The Nyquist Court found three main distinctions from the property tax exemption ap-
proved in Walz. See supra notes 5 1-53 and accompanying text. First, unlike the Walz exemption,
the Nyquist deduction enjoyed no historical acceptance. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973). Also unlike the Walz exemption, the Nyquist deduction benefited a
predominantly religious class. Id. at 794. Finally, the Court found the Nyquist deduction to have
none of "the elements of a genuine tax deduction, such as for charitable contributions" and, there-
fore, the Walz neutrality test was inapplicable. Id. at 790 n.49.
The Nyquist Court did not define "genuine tax deduction," but the Internal Revenue Code
offers guidance in its provision for a federal income tax deduction for charitable contributions. It
states in pertinent part: . . . [Tihe term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to
or for the use of. . . [a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation. . . organized
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. . . . I.R.C.
§ 170(c) (1982). The Internal Revenue Code definition precludes, therefore, payment for services
received. See Hunter, supra note 56, at 538 n.64 (criticizing the Nyquist Court for failing to state
in its comparison with the Walz exemption that the tuition deduction was incomparable to any
charitable deduction since the latter is never available in return for a product or service). See also
Wisconsin Dept. of Tax v. Belle City Malleable Iron Co., 258 Wis. 101, 106, 45 N.W.2d 68, 71
(1950) (stating that "a charitable contribution is a voluntary transfer of property ... without
thought or expectation of recompense, reward or rivate gain. ); infra note 88 (describing
mechanical elements of deduction).
88. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). The
statute in Roemer was the same as the one challenged in Mueller v. Allen. See supra note 6. It
provided income tax deductions for some educational expenses incurred by parents with children
in private and public schools. See supra notes 7-9. The statute withstood establishment challenge
in part because it benefited the parents of children in sectarian and nonsectarian private schools as
well as parents with publicly educated children. 452 F. Supp. at 1320-22. Thus, the benefited
class was not predominantly composed of those pursuing religious education, as in Nyquist. See
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uniformly rejected a variety of tax pfans89 conferring relief on parents
of private school children. For example, in Rhode Island Federation of
Teachers v. Norberg9" the First Circuit, relying on Nyquist, held that a
statute9' granting parents of all elementary and secondary school stu-
dents a personal income tax deduction for tuition,92 textbook 93 and
transportation 94 expenses violated the establishment clause. 9  In its
consideration of the tuition deduction, the court found insignificant 96
the extension of the benefited class to include parents of public school
students. The tuition deduction, therefore, was not neutral because the
expenditures for tuition were incurred predominantly by private school
parents.97 Furthermore, because the textbook deduction covered in-
structional materials, assurance of the secular nature and continued
secular use of these materials required government surveillance or au-
diting. Such measures would have excessively entangled the state in
the affairs of the church.98 Consequently, the entanglement factor dis-
supra note 89. The court further emphasized that the statute in question provided a true tax
deduction because it allowed a subtraction from the tax base, not from taxes owed. 452 F. Supp.
at 1321. Thus, a benefit resulted only if the deduction moved the taxpayer into a lower tax brack-
et. The court's definition of a true tax deduction was, therefore, limited to the mechanics of tax
deductions and did not reflect the requirement that charitable contributions be gratuitous. In
Roemer parents received education for their children in return for tuition, textbook and transpor-
tation expenditures. But see supra note 89.
89. See, e.g., Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978) (tax
deduction up to $1000 per child in private elementary or secondary school), aff'd, 590 F.2d 514
(3rd Cir. 1979); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (tax credits to parents of
private school students), afdsub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex,
342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio) (gifts to parents of $90 per child in private school), af7d mem., 409
U.S. 808 (1972); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344
(1974) (tax credits for educational costs to parents with children in nonpublic schools), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
90. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
91. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980). Provisions of the statute are identical in perti-
nent part to the Minnesota statute upheld in Mueller v. Allen. See supra note 6.
92. 630 F.2d at 858. See supra note 7.
93. 630 F.2d at 861. See supra note 9.
94. 630 F.2d at 862. See supra note 8.
95. 630 F.2d at 863.
96. The court stated: "Absent a class having primarily secular characteristics, as found in
Waz and presumed to exist in Roemer, it cannot be said that the advantages flowing from the
statute to the parents of sectarian school students will be incidental to secular ends and ef-
fects. ... Id at 861.
97. Ninety-four percent of the students attending Rhode Island's nonpublic and tuition-
funded public schools in 1979 attended sectarian schools. Id at 859.
98. The court emphasized that although the deduction would be taken by the parent, the
sectarian school would undoubtedly control the choice of texts and instructional materials; conse-
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tinguished the Norberg textbook provision from those approved in
precedential textbook cases.99 Finally, the transportation deduction
passed constitutional scrutiny,"°° but it was not severable' 0 ' from the
other provisions.
Two years after Norberg, the Eighth Circuit in Mueller v. Allen'0 z
upheld a Minnesota statute 0 3 nearly identical to the one invalidated by
the First Circuit. The Mueller court found the program to have the
valid secular purpose of improving the quality of education for all chil-
dren.104 In contrast to the Norberg decision, however, the Eighth Cir-
cuit also approved the tuition, textbook and transportation deductions
because their primary effect was the promotion of pluralistic education
rather than religion."0 5
The court relied on the expansive scope of the benefited class 0 6 to
discredit a primary effect challenge. Because the benefits extended to
all parents with children in Minnesota elementary and secondary
schools, the court reasoned that, as in Walz, 10 7 the neutrality require-
ment was satisfied. Plaintiffs failed to prove that public school parents
benefited less than private school parents.'0 8 Furthermore, the Mueller
quently, any surveillance that would begin with the parents would necessarily encompass the
school. Id at 862. But see infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
99. The court distinguished the Rhode Island textbook deduction from textbook loan pro-
grams approved by the Supreme Court which afford the state absolute control over the content of
the books and their continued secular use. 630 F.2d at 861-62. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968). See also supra note 51.
100. The court only alluded to the constitutionality of the provision in its pronouncement that
"it could not be severed from the unconstitutional portions of the statute." 630 F.2d at 862. Judge
Levin in his concurring and dissenting opinion was more direct when he stated that the transpor-
tation provision was, by itself, constitutional. Id at 863 (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
101. The court concluded that the legislature would not have enacted the transportation provi-
sion alone. Id
102. 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-195).
103. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09 (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 6.
104. 676 F.2d at 1198.
105. Id at 1205.
106. The court stated "[Tlhe Minnesota statute has not singled out a class of citizens for spe-
cial economic benefit. It is neutral on its face; and under the facts presented here, we cannot reject
this facial neutrality as mere window dressing." Id at 1204.
107. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
108. Plaintiffs' statistics, obtained from the Minnesota Department of Education, indicated
that in the 1979-80 school year 4.56% of the 90,954 private school pupils attended nonsectarian
facilities. In the previous year, 3.7 1% of the 88,524 nonpublic school students had attended non-
sectarian schools. 676 F.2d at 1198. Based on these figures, plaintiffs argued that 71% of the 2.4
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court contended that the deduction package was more closely analo-
gous to tax deductions provided by the Internal Revenue Service for
charitable contributions" 9 than to the tax credits disallowed in
Nyquist .110
The court found the transportation deduction permissible under Ev-
erson. 1 Similarly, it held the textbook deduction analogous to the al-
lowance approved in Board of Education v. Allen.' 12 Although the
Supreme Court struck down grants of instructional materials in three
cases,113 the Mueller court rejected any comparisons because those in-
stances involved substantial loans directly to the institutions." 4
The tuition deduction presented the court with an admittedly more
difficult analysis. I" Because the Minnesota scheme did not guarantee
a benefit to every eligible parent,' 1 6 the court found that the benefits
million dollars in revenue the state would lose through the tuition deduction could be attributed to
parents with children in religious schools. Id at 1199. The tax commissioner, however, argued
that the statistics were incomplete because they "fail[ed] to account for tax benefits running to
taxpayers with dependents in public and nonsectarian private schools with ordinary tuition...
textbooks. . transportation. . . summer school and driver's education class tuition expenses."
Id The court agreed with the commissioner. Id at 1205.
109. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982). See supra note 89. See also supra notes 79 & 90 and accompany-
ing text.
110. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). The court distinguished the statute in Nyqulst which allowed deduc-
tion from adjusted gross income of an amount determined not in relation to what a parent actually
paid in tuition, but rather in accordance with a set scale based on income level. See supra note 78.
Thus, the Mueller court reasoned that the statute in Nyquist guaranteed a tax benefit, which oper-
ated as a tax credit. 676 F.2d at 1203.
111. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
112. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The precedential value
of Allen has been strengthened by the Court's continued acceptance of textbook provisions after
adoption of the excessive entanglement theory. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
113. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), af'dmem., 417 U.S.
961 (1974).
114. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1201 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-195).
115. The court stated: "It is not without difficulty that we reach our decision .... [W]e are
dealing with an indirect state subsidy of tuition which can be viewed 'as an incentive to parents to
send their children to sectarian schools' .... ." Id at 1204 (quoting Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825
(1973)).
116. A tax deduction is subtracted from a taxpayer's adjusted gross income, not from the taxes
owed. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (5th ed. 1979). The adjusted gross income determines an
individual's tax bracket. Although individuals in a single bracket will be taxed at the same rate, a
range of adjusted gross incomes appears in a single bracket. Thus, "whether a parent obtains a tax
benefit depends upon whether the deduction is sufficient to move the taxpayer from a higher
bracket to a lower one" 676 F.2d at 1204.
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conferred on religious institutions were more uncertain and diffused" 7
than in Nyquist"18 or Norberg." 9 As a result, the provision primarily
benefited the parents, not the educational institutions. Thus, along
with the textbook and transportation provisions, the tuition provision
withstood constitutional challenge at the second tier of the nonestab-
lishment test.' 2
0
Outside the Eighth Circuit, a solid consensus has developed in oppo-
sition to providing indirect aid to parochial elementary and secondary
schools through direct grants and tax benefits to parents of private
school children.' 2 The opposition is based on a clear understanding of
the basic meaning of the establishment clause 122 of the first amendment
and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the relation of that clause to
sectarian education.'
23
The Supreme Court's three tier establishment test has been effec-
tively reduced to two levels. The original criterion, that the legislation
in question serve a secular purpose, has steadily diminished in impor-
tance since the Court first acknowledged in Abington School District v.
Schempp ' 24 that a legislature may write a plausible secular purpose
statement into any suspect legislation. 25 Furthermore, in the area of
education, no measure that improves the quality of a child's schooling,
public or private, seriously may be deemed lacking in social value.'26
In Mueller v. Allen, 27 the Eighth Circuit correctly approved the tax
deduction legislation at this first level of analysis because the secular
purpose behind the statute was plausible. The legislation was designed
to alleviate some of the financial burdens plaguing both public and pri-
vate school parents and thus enable a healthy educational pluralism to
117. 676 F.2d at 1204.
118. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
120. 676 F.2d at 1205.
121. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 20, 21 & 32.
123. See supra notes 26-32 & 58-87 and accompanying text.
124. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
125. See supra note 46. See generally Note, supra note 36, at 1179-80 (discussing decline of
independent purpose test with incorporation into legislation of stated secular purpose, as in
Nyquist).
126. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1198, 1206 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-195) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., con-
curring in part)).
127. 676 F.2d at 1195.
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continue. 128  Nevertheless, plausible purposes do not guarantee
constitutionality.
In the past decade, the primary effect standard has emerged as the
essence of establishment clause analysis. 29 When the Mueller legisla-
tion passes to this level of inquiry, the transportation and textbook de-
ductions could avoid serious challenge. The tuition deduction,
however, fails. 3 °
The continued vitality of the Supreme Court's approval of transpor-
tation reimbursements in Everson '3' effectively precludes a successful
attack on a transportation deduction. The law is equally clear in the
area of textbook loans. 32 The instructional material component of the
Minnesota textbook deduction may be questioned, however, because
the Supreme Court has invalidated a number of direct loans to reli-
gious schools for secular materials. 133 The Mueller court contended
that those cases were distinguishable because the deduction in Mueller
was relatively small and directed to parents, not institutions. 34 The
more convincing argument, however, is that auditing of materials
bought by parents does not require the state to entangle itself in the
affairs of the religious school. 135 Any governmental inquiry into the
secular nature of a deduction would involve an audit of the individual
claimant, not the educational facility to which a child is sent.' 36 Thus,
the textbook and transportation provisions justifiably passed establish-
ment scrutiny.
In contrast to the transportation and textbook components, the tui-
tion tax deduction cannot effectively be used solely for secular pur-
poses. It is designed to allow parents to send their children to private
schools, the majority of which are church-affiliated. 37  The tuition
128. Id at 1198. The court agreed that the "manifest purpose of the statute is to provide all
taxpayers a benefit which will operate to enhance the quality of education .... ." Id
129. Note, supra note 38, at 1190. See also supra note 56 (discussing the weaknesses of the
excessive entanglement test).
130. See infra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
131. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Supreme Court has not overturned the decision in 35 years.
132. See supra note 112.
133. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
134. 676 F.2d at 1202.
135. Id (quoting from the district court's opinion, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (D. Minn. 1981)).
136. Even if the Court accepted the argument that an audit of a parent would lead to surveil-
lance of the educational facility, it is unlikely that the Court would invalidate the program on the
excessive entanglement theory alone. See supra note 56.
137. 676 F.2d at 1198. According to figures supplied by the Minnesota Department of Educa-
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charged at parochial institutions supports not only the secular aspects
of education, but also the religious elements. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the religious experience permeates the
lower levels of sectarian education. 38
The Mueller court failed in its attempt to pass the tuition deduction
section of the statute through the primary effect test by drawing com-
parisons between the provision and the church property exemption ap-
proved in Walz v. Tax Commission . 139 First, the Walz decision was
supported by substantial and historically accepted federal and state ac-
tion. 4 ' No similar historical argument supports tuition deductions.
Second, church property under New York law assumed an equal posi-
tion with educational and charitable property.' 4' To contend, for ex-
ample, that a deduction for public school driver education tuition is
comparable to deduction for full time parochial school tuition is ques-
tionable. Walz does not represent the theory that superficial expansion
of the breadth of a benefited class will legitimize an otherwise religion-
advancing statute.' 42 Third, drawing a comparison between the tuition
deduction and deductions routinely granted by the Internal Revenue
Service for donations to charitable organizations is inappropriate be-
cause parents are receiving a service for their tuition; payment of tui-
tion for private education is not a gift.143 Finally, the acceptance, not
the rejection, of tuition tax deductions would lead to the Walz Court's
fear of excessive administrative entanglement and political di-
visiveness. 44
tion and introduced at trial, 4.56% of the students attending private schools were enrolled in non-
sectarian institutions.
138. See supra note 58.
139. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See supra notes 53 & 107 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 52.
141. See supra notes 51 & 53 and accompanying text.
142. The Walz Court strongly emphasized that religious property did not dominate the ex-
empted class. See supra note 53. See also supra note 96.
143. 676 F.2d at 1205. For a discussion of the Internal Revenue Code definition of a deduc-
tion for a charitable contribution, see supra note 87.
144. Unlike textbooks and transportation, tuition represents a nonseverable element of a
child's religious education. As the Court stated in Nyquist, when a provision applies broadly to
tuition, there is no attempt "to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational
functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the former." Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1972) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613
(1971)). Nonetheless, any attempt to make such a determination would necessarily lead the gov-
ernment to excessive surveillance of the school and entanglement of its affairs. See supra notes 56
& 66 and accompanying text.
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The Eighth Circuit also relied on the indirect nature of the aid to
discount charges of religious advancement.1 45 According to the deci-
sion in Nyquist,146 however, making parents the conduits of the aid
does not prevent the religious educational facility from ultimately re-
ceiving a substantial benefit as a result of steady or increased enroll-
ment. 147 The Supreme Court has yet to adopt a "parent benefit" theory
to approve indirect aid to religious institutions. 148 Furthermore, while
the deduction does not guarantee a savings to every eligible parent 149 as
the Nyquist provision did, certainly those parents with the heaviest edu-
cational expenses are most likely to benefit from the deduction. 150 Al-
though the text of the law refers to all parents,' 5 ' the primary benefit
flows to the largest tuition-paying class, the sectarian school parents.' 52
As a result, the tuition tax deduction promotes religious education and
should fail the primary effect 53 tier of establishment clause inquiry.
The Mueller court reached a conclusion inconsistent with the rele-
vant holdings of the Supreme Court.'5 4 The approval of tax benefits
for tuition-paying parents of sectarian school children is startling in
light of the consistency of decisions condemning parent benefit stat-
utes.' 55 Therefore, it is doubtful that the Minnesota statute will with-
stand Supreme Court scrutiny.
M EK
145. 676 F.2d at 1202.
146. 413 U.S. 756 (1972). See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
147. "By reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the State seeks to relieve
their financial burdens sufficiently to assure that they continue to have the option to send
their children to religion-oriented schools. And while the other purposes for that aid
. . . are certainly unexceptional, the effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired
financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions."
413 U.S. at 783. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
148. Cf. supra notes 34 (discussing the "child benefit" theory) & 89 (citing cases in which the
passage of a benefit to parents was inconsequential to the outcome of constitutional analysis).
149. See supra note 116.
150. See supra notes 76 & 116.
151. See supra note 6.
152. See supra note 137. See also MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 120.06 (West Supp. 1982) (providing
tuition-free public education for children within district).
153. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 26-87 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PRETRIAL CUSTODIAL
IDENTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576
(1981)
In People v. Bustamante,I the California Supreme Court relied on the
state constitution2 to extend an accused's right to counsel to preindict-
ment 3 custodial lineups.'
Police officers arrested defendant on suspicion of robbery5 and other
crimes. 6 While defendant was in custody, a witness to the robbery pos-
itively identified him in a preindictment lineup. The witness reaffirmed
his identification at trial. Although defendant had requested counsel
1. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981).
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 states:
The defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial, to compel at-
tendance of witnesses in the defendant's behalf, to have the assistance of counsel for the
defendant's defense, to be personally present with counsel, and to be confronted with the
witnesses against the defendant. The Legislature may provide for the deposition of a
witness in the presence of the defendant and the defendant's counsel.
A series of recent California cases have interpreted this provision of the California Constitution
independently of United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting parallel provisions of the
federal constitution. See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762
(1980).
3. For purposes of this Comment, the term "preindictment" encompasses the period prior to
the filing of an information for felony prosecutions and the filing of a formal complaint in misde-
meanor prosecutions. The California Supreme Court in Bustamante similarly defined "preindict-
ment." 30 Cal. 3d at 91 n.1, 634 P.2d at 929, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 578. For statutes defining the use of
an indictment or complaint, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737, 740 (Deering 1982); FED. R.
CRuM. P. 3, 7. See also infra note 54.
4. Lineups, showups, and photograph displays are the custodial identification procedures
most frequently used in criminal investigations and prosecutions. In lineups and showups the
police present the suspect to the witness in person. See infra note 31 for a brief discussion of
lineup and showup procedures.
The photograph display procedure entails a presentation by the police of an array or "lineup"
of several photographs from which the witness identifies the suspect. For a discussion of the
dangers and constitutional safeguards of the various identification procedures, see Grano, Kirby,
Biggers & Ash, Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the
Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717 (1974). For current developments in case law on the right to
counsel at pretrial identification proceedings, see N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (1981);
Note, The Right to Counsel- Attachment Before Criminal Judicial Proceeding 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 810 (1979).
5. Defendant's appeal to the California Supreme Court focused solely on his robbery con-
viction. 30 Cal. 3d at 94, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
6, The State ultimately charged defendant with robbery, burglary, theft of a gun, receipt of
stolen property, possession of a firearm, possession of cocaine, and possession of concentrated
cannabis. Id at 93, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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prior to the lineup, none was provided until sometime after the identifi-
cation proceeding.7
At trial, the defense moved to exclude the witness's in-court identifi-
cation testimony from evidence, contending that it was based on a cus-
todial lineup during which the State violated defendant's right to
counsel." The trial court denied the motion and the jury subsequently
convicted defendant.' The defendant appealed the conviction ° on the
ground that the trial court erred in admitting the identification testi-
mony."1  In a plurality decision, the California Supreme Court12 re-
versed the conviction and held: Under the California Constitution, an
accused has a right to assistance of counsel at a preindictment lineup.' 3
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in
1791, guarantees criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel
in federal prosecutions. 4 In Gideon v. Wainwright, 5 the United States
7. Id at 93, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The facts do not specify the point at
which the defendant first received counsel's assistance.
8. Id at 93, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Prior to trial, the defense moved to
challenge the witness' lineup identification on the same grounds. The trial court denied the mo-
tion. Id The victim of the crime identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing, and re-
peated this identification at trial. The defendant did not object to the victim's identification
testimony, however, because there were no due process violations at the preliminary hearing iden-
tification. Id
9. Id In addition to the robbery conviction, the jury convicted defendant of receiving stolen
property, being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, possessing cocaine, and possessing concen-
trated cannabis. The jury acquitted defendant on the charges of burglary and theft of a stolen
gun. Id
10. People v. Bustamante, 110 Cal. App. 3d 981, 168 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1980).
11. The absence of counsel at a police lineup conducted after June 12, 1967, is reversible
error. Any suspect participating in a custodial lineup after the Supreme Court decisions of United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), is entitled to
counsel as a matter of right. See also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
12. The California Supreme Court sat en banc.
13. 30 Cal. 3d at 101-02, 634 P.2d at 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85.
14. In 1789 Congress passed the sixth amendment with almost no debate. Rachow, The Right
to Counsel- English and American Precedents, 11 WM. & MARY Q. 1, 21-26 (1954). The sixth
amendment reads in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, § 1.
Historically, the right to counsel was a procedural right available to defendants in selected crim-
inal and capital cases in England. See generally Note, An Historical Argumentfor the Right to
Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018 n.99 (1964). Historians and coin-
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Supreme Court extended the specific guarantees of the sixth amend-
ment to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 6 In addition to the sixth and fourteenth amendment safe-
guards, criminal defendants at the state level are guaranteed the right
mentators on English law agree that a defendant prosecuted in a criminal trial for a felony or a
lesser wrong could receive legal assistance at pleadings of exception and at other intervals during
trial. Case law, statutes, and Yearbooks do not clearly define the stages of the criminal trial at
which the assistance of counsel attached.
The criminal defendant's right to counsel was preserved in common law England as an absolute
right. In sixteenth century England, however, courts began to limit the assignment of counsel by
establishing a distinction between fact and law on issues in a criminal trial. Courts began to
restrict the right to assistance of counsel to defendants pleading matters of law and denied advice
of counsel on issues or demonstrations of fact. Frequently courts narrowly construed what consti-
tuted questions of law, further limiting an accused's right to counsel. Jaeger, The Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogatiox The Aftermath of Escobedo, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 337, 347 n.57 (1965).
English courts denied defendants accused of treason the assistance of counsel. The use of wit-
nesses to introduce and illustrate factual issues developed concurrently with the right to counsel.
The courts maintained that witness confrontations and accusations of treasonous conduct were
matters of fact, not law, and thus the defendant was not entitled to counsel. See Russet's Case, 9
How. St. Tr. 577 (1683); Raleigh's Case, 1 How. St. Tr. 236 (1603). For a history of the develop-
ment of the right to counsel in common law England, see generally 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 244-72 (1883); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 607-20 (1936 ed.).
American courts did not adhere to the distinction articulated in English statutes and cases, and
thus, did not similarly restrict the right to counsel. Eleven of the thirteen colonies abolished the
dichotomic application of right to counsel either expressly or by implication in colonial statutory
provisions or constitutions granting the accused the right to the assistance of counsel: Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Note, supra, at 1030-31.
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. The Gideon Court stated: "[A] provision of the Bill of Rights which is fundamental and
essential to a fair trial is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at
342. The pertinent portion of the fourteenth amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Previously, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court recognized that indi-
gent defendants in capital cases were entitled to assistance of counsel at trial and at stages prior to
trial. The Court relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than the
sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. In
1938, the Court applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to federal felony prosecutions.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Johnson Court, however, refused to extend the right
to counsel to state felony prosecutions. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court reaf-
firmed Johnson and held that the "due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment." Id at 461-62. The
Betts Court interpreted the due process clause narrowly and concluded that counsel's assistance at
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to counsel by parallel state constitutional provisions.17 Although the
state criminal prosecutions was a matter of state law and not a right protected by the federal
constitution. Id.
In 1963,'the Supreme Court overruled Bells in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. By granting indigent defendants the right to counsel in
all state criminal prosecutions, the Court in Gideon determined that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment fully incorporated the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel.
See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 514-19 (1980).
17. By 1789, the states had enacted statutes and ordinances expressly granting defendants the
assistance of counsel at criminal trials. North Carolina passed a statute providing that "every
person accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to counsel in all mat-
ters which may be necessary for his defense, as well to facts as to law .. " I N.C. REV. LAWS
225 (1777) (Iredell & Martin eds. 1804), cited in Note, supra note 14, at 1029. In addition, several
other states enacted similar provisions granting a defendant the right to counsel in felony as well
as misdemeanor prosecutions. See S.C. PUa. LAWS 25 (1731) (Grimke ed. 1790); 2 Z. SwiFT, A
SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 392, 398-99 (1796). Delaware, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania relied on the Penn Charter of 1701 to grant defendants the right to
counsel in criminal trials, explicitly extending the common law right: "[A]U criminals shall have
the same Privileges of Witness and Council as their Prosecutors." PENN CHARTER art. V (1701),
reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS AND ORGANIC LAWS
3079 (Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as THORPE]. See also DEL. CONST. art. XXIV (1776),
reprintedin 1 THORPE, supra, at 566; NJ. CONST. art. XVI (1776), reprintedin 5 THORPE, XUpra, at
2597. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont enacted constitutional provi-
sions that included the assistance of counsel as part of an accused's right to defend himself in a
criminal trial: "Every subject shall have a right. . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself,
and counsel." N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV (1784), reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra, at 2455. See also
MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (1780), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1891; PENN. CONST. art. IX
(1776), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 3083; VT. CONST. ch. I, § 10 (1777), reprinted in 6 THORPE,
supra, at 3741. The Maryland Constitution of 1776 simply provided that defendants in criminalprosecutions are entitled to counsel. MD. CONST. art. XIX, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1688.
New York's constitution explicitly guaranteed that "in every trial, impeachment or indictment for
crimes or misdemeanors, the party impeached or indicted shall be allowed counsel, as in civil
actions." N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIV (1777), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 2635.
After the states ratified the United States Constitution, Georgia and Rhode Island drafted con-
stitutional provisions ensuring the accused the right to counsel. The Georgia constitution of 1798
provided that "no person shall be debarred from advocating or defending himself or counsel, or
both." GA. CONST. art. III, § 8, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra, at 799. Rhode Island modified its
Declaration of Rights to include a right to counsel provision similar to that of the sixth amend-
ment. R.I. REV. PUB. LAWS 80-81, § 6 (1798). See generally W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERICAN COURTS 18-22 (1955); Note, supra note 14, at 1055-57.
Today, 49 states have constitutional provisions entitling a defendant to the assistance of counsel
in criminal prosecutions. Alaska, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island and
West Virginia adopted wording similar to that of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused ... is entitled to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.") See also IOWA CONST. art 1, § 10; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20; MINN.
CONsT. art. 1, § 6; N.J. CONsT. art. 1, 1 10; R.I. CONST. art. 1 § 10; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14. In
37 states, the accused is entitled to be defended by counsel, by himself, or by both. See ALA.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15;
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. 1,
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right to counsel is firmly established in both state and federal jurisdic-
tions, courts disagree on the stage of the criminal proceeding at which
the right must attach.'8
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, 9 the Supreme Court recognized that
a defendant's right to a fair trial is contingent upon the extension of his
right to counsel beyond the boundaries of the trial itself.20 Although
the Powell Court specifically held that an indigent offender in a capital
case is entitled to a court-appointed attorney,2' the Court additionally
asserted that a defendant's right to counsel encompasses pretrial pro-
ceedings2 2 from arraingment to the beginning of trial.23 In reaching
§ 16; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. 1 § 8; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13; KAN. CONST. BILL
OF RTS., § 10; Ky. CONST. § 11; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MASS. CONST. § 13; MISS. CONST. art. 3,
§ 26; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 11; NEV.
CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 20; OR. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7, TENN. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 10; WASH. CONST.
art. 1, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 7; Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
Five state constitutions have notably different provisions for the right to counsel. GA. CONST.
art. 1, § 2-111 ("a defendant is to have the privilege and benefit of counsel'); HAWAII CONST. art.
I, § 11 ("right to assistance of counsel and, if the accused is indigent, the appointment of coun-
sel"); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (same); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs., art. 21 ("an accused is to be
allowed counsel"); N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 23 ("the accused has the right to counsel").
In Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977), and People v. Jackson, 39 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d
22 (1974), the Alaska and Michigan Supreme Courts, by relying on their state constitutional provi-
sions, granted defendants counsel in state criminal prosecutions at stages in which the United
States Supreme Court, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), did not require counsel. See
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20. See also supra notes 47-52 and accompa-
nying text.
Virginia is the only state that safeguards a criminal defendant's right to counsel by statute, see
VA. CODE §§ 19.2-157 to .2-163 (1950 & Supp. 1982), and by judicial interpretation, see, e.g.,
Timmons v. Peyton, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1966); Noe v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Va. 1970).
18. See infra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, defendants charged with rape did not have legal assistance
at their arraignment. On the morning of the trial the judge designated counsel to represent de-
fendants, although the record indicated the court-appointed attorney exerted at most casual efforts
in representing the defendants. The jury found defendants guilty of rape and sentenced them to
death. The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the state denied the defend-
ant a fair trial and right to counsel in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 52-56.
20. Id at 57.
21. Id at 71. The Powell Court held:
[lln a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiter-
acy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for
him as a necessary requisite of due process of law....
Id
22. Pretrial proceedings include arraignment, see, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
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this conclusion, the Court reasoned that these stages constitute a "criti-
cal period" of the adversary criminal process.24
Subsequently, in Hamilton v. Alabama,25 the Warren Court, relied on
the Powell opinion to hold that a defendant's right to counsel attaches
at "any critical stage" 26 in the criminal proceeding. Thereafter, state
and federal courts frequently applied the critical stage test to grant
counsel at arraignments,27 preliminary hearings, 28 and custodial
(1961); Salty v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972); McLean v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St. 2d 226, 208
N.E.2d 139 (1965), preliminary hearing, see, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United
States v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1970); State v. Owens, 391 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1965), and
custodial interrogation, see, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States ex
rel Dickerson, 430 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1970); State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551 (1965).
23. 287 U.S. at 57. Powell firmly established the necessity of counsel in a pretrial context:
"[The accused] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence." Id at 69. The Powell Court recognized that preparation of a
defendant's case during the pretrial stages would ultimately affect the defendant's right to a fair
trial. The delay or denial of appointing an attorney before trial would "amount to a denial of
effective and substantial aid in that regard." Id at 53. Later cases shared the Powell Court's
concern that an inadequately prepared defense would derrogate an accused's right to a fair trial.
See, eg., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961);
United States ex rel Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972).
24. The Supreme Court defined the "critical period" of criminal proceedings as "the time of
[the defendants'] arraignment and the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going
investigation and preparation [are] vitally important. . . . [Defendants are] as much entitled to
such aid during that period as at the trial itself." 287 U.S. at 57.
25. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
26. The Hamilton Court reasoned that what happens in a "critical stage of a criminal pro-
ceeding. . . may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then
and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic
purposes." Id at 54.
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test to determine whether a specific element in a
criminal prosecution constitutes a "critical stage:" whatever occurs at that particular stage must
affect the whole trial; jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair trial; and counsel's assistance
during that particular stage must have the capacity to help ensure procedural fairness to the de-
fendant. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 16, at 521.
In Hamilton, the Court determined that arraignment constitutes a critical stage in Alabama
criminal proceedings. The Court reasoned that if the Alabama defendant fails to plead his de-
fenses at arraignment, they are waived for the remainder of the prosecution. ALA. CODE tit. 15,
§ 279 (1959 & Supp. 1973) (Alabama criminal code in effect at the time the Supreme Court
decided Hamilton).
27. See, e.g., Saltys v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972); Tucker v. State, 42 Ala. App.
174, 157 So. 2d 229 (1963); State v. Morrocco, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 568, 203 A.2d 161 (1964); People v.
Combs, 19 A.D.2d 639, 241 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1963); McLean v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St. 2d 226, 208
N.E.2d 139 (1965); Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 860 (1964).
28. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963); United States v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1970); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169
(4th Cir. 1970); Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 391 P.2d 542 (1964); People v. Morris, 30 111. 2d
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interrogations.2 9
In 1967, in United States v. Wade,3" the Supreme Court held that
postindictment lineups3t constituted a "critical stage" 32 in federal crim-
406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964); State v. Young, 194 Kan. 242, 398 P.2d 584 (1965); Commonwealth v.
O'Leary, 347 Mass. 387, 198 N.E.2d 403 (1964); State v. Owens, 391 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1965);
Rainsberger v. State, 81 Nev. 92, 399 P.2d 129 (1965); Sanders v. Cox, 74 N.M. 524, 395 P.2d 353,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); Pettit v. Rhay, 62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963); Sparkman
v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965).
29. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (right to counsel should "'apply to
indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.'" See also
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); United States ex rel Dickerson v. Rundel, 430 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1970);
Brown v. Crouse, 425 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1970); State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551 (1965);
People v. White, 233 Cal. App. 2d 765, 43 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1965); Harris v. State, 162 So. 2d 262
(Fla. 1964); Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 938
(1965); Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 140, 207 A.2d 643 (1965); State v. Lanzo, 44 N.J. 560, 210 A.2d
613 (1965); State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 398 P.2d 482 (1965); Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa.
437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688 (1965). See
generally Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1974); Note, The State Re-
sponses to Kirby v. United States, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 423.
30. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade, police arrested defendant for bank robbery after an indict-
ment had been returned. Prior to trial, federal agents directed defendant to participate in a lineup
with five or six other persons. Each member of the lineup wore strips of tape on their faces,
similar to those allegedly worn by the robbers, and were ordered to say "put the money in the
bag." Both witnesses positively identified defendant. Although the court had appointed counsel
to represent defendant, the attorney was not present at the pretrial lineup. At the trial, the wit-
nesses reconfirmed their positive identification of defendant. Id at 220.
31. Lineups and showups are the two types of custodial identification procedures. In a
showup, the police present the lone suspect to the witness for identification. Showups are either
arranged or accidental. N. SOBEL, supra note 4, at §§ 2-15 to -21. In a proper lineup or "identifi-
cation parade," police direct the suspect and five or six other persons of similar height, age, and
general appearance to line up or parade before witness. Lineups are most often used in cases of
robbery and rape. The lineup has become a means frequently employed by the police to "provide
them with fairly strong evidence of identity on which to proceed with their investigations and to
base an eventual prosecution." Williams & Hammelnan, Identfication Parades, Part 1, 1963
CRIM. L. REV. 479, 480. The Senate exemplified the popularity of eyewitness identification in its
committee hearings on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, when it de-
scribed eyewitness identification as "an essential prosecutorial tool." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1968), cited in Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal IdentiFcation: The
Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1973). See generally N. SOBEL, supra
note 4; P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965).
The development of a defendant's rights in showup identification procedures has been similar
to that of the lineup except the courts usually assume a vigorous position against the use of a
showup as a custodial identification method. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973). For an overview of the development
of the rights of the accused in showups, see generally Grano, supra note 4; Pulaski, Neil v. Big-
gers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1097 (1974).
32. The Wade Court described the pretrial identification confrontation as critical because
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inal prosecutions during which the accused must be afforded the right
to counsel.33 The Court reasoned that the dangers inherent in lineup
"the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." 388
U.S. at 224. The prejudicial effect that a pretrial custodial lineup has on the trial rests on the
"common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely
to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may. . . for all practical
purposes be determined there and then before the trial." Williams & Hammelman, supra note 31,
at 482.
The Court distinguished pretrial lineups from other "preparatory step[s] in the gathering of the
prosecutor's evidence." 388 U.S. at 227. The Court held counsel's presence to be unnecessary
during such evidence-gathering procedures as taking blood samples, see Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); fingerprinting, see Woods v. United States, 397 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1968);
taking photographs of the accused, see Sandoval v. State, 172 Colo. 383, 473 P.2d 722 (1970); and
physical examination and measurement of the accused, see State v. Hughes, 244 La. 774, 154 So.
2d 395 (1963). These identification methods, reasoned the Court, are based on scientific tech-
niques with limited variables; defense counsel could accurately reconstruct the given procedure at
trial and could effectively cross-examine witnesses about it. The Court concluded that "[these
procedures] are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that . . .[defendant's] counsel's
absence at such stages might derrogate from his right to a fair trial." 388 U.S. at 227-28.
33. Justice Brennan argued that the Court must "scrutinize any pretrial confrontation" to
assess whether defendant needs counsel to preserve his fifth and sixth amendment rights. 388 U.S.
at 227. The Court based its holding on the "principle that in addition to counsel's presence at
trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derrogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial." Id at 226.
In addition to extending the right to counsel at postindictment lineups, the Wade Court an-
nounced an exclusionary sanction to be imposed whenever a defendant's right to counsel at pre-
trial lineups has been violated. On cross-examination, the Wade defendant's counsel revealed that
the witnesses previously identified defendant at an uncounseled lineup. Defense counsel sought to
strike the in-court identification testimony of the bank witnesses, alleging that it was based on the
uncounseled lineups. Id. at 239-40. The Court held that identifications resulting from improperly
conducted pretrial lineups are inadmissible as evidence at trial. In addition, the Court held that
in-court identification testimony based on improper lineups could be excluded. In establishing the
exclusionary sanction, the Wade Court recognized that pretrial lineups are often used by the pros-
ecution to "crystallize" the witness' memory for later identification of defendant. The Court,
however, refused to establish an automatic exclusionary rule for in-court identifications based on
uncounseled lineups. Id at 240.
To lessen the severity of the exclusionary sanction, the Wade Court employed the independent
source test established by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963). 388 U.S.-at 240-41. The Court held that ifthe State could "establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence" that the in-court identification was based on observations independent of the uncon-
stitutional lineups, then the in-court identification would be admitted into evidence. Id at 240.
The Supreme Court enumerated several factors useful in determining whether the in-court identi-
fication has a source independent of the illegal pretrial lineup, including:
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrep-
ancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the de-
fendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to
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identifications34 may seriously jeopardize the accused's right to a fair
trial.35 Counsel present at the identification proceeding 36 could detect
suggestive actions,37 avoid the risks of mistaken identification,3 8 and
consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the
conduct of the lineup.
Id at 241 (footnote omitted).
In a companion case, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Supreme Court automati-
cally excluded the in-court identification of eyewitnesses, determining that the identification was
the direct result of an improper pretrial lineup. Upon direct examination of the witnesses, the
State demonstrated that these witnesses had previously identified the defendant at a post-indict-
ment lineup at which counsel was absent. The Court determined that the in-court identification
was the "direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"
388 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). The Court in
Gilbert determined that evidence of an unconstitutional pretrial lineup identification is not admis-
sible in a state criminal trial.
The Court held further that evidence of an illegal pretrial lineup must be excluded per se from
the State's case-in-chief. In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that in such a situation the
uncounseled pretrial identification bolstered the in-court identification and the State should not be
afforded an opportunity to establish alternative sources for the irreparably tainted in-court identi-
fication. Id at 273.
34. Justice Brennan reasoned that lineups are inherently dangerous and threaten a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial:
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are
rife with instances of mistaken identification. . . . A major factor contributing to the
high incidence of miscarriage of'justice from mistaken identification has been the degree
of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to
witnesses for pretrial identification ....
Moreover,
[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at
the lineup, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of
identity may . . . for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the
trial.
388 U.S. at 228-29 (footnote omitted).
35. See supra notes 23 & 26.
36. The presence of counsel at lineups would eliminate or reduce the risks of suggestion and
abuse, ensure defendant's right to confront his accusors, and protect defendant's right to a fair
trial by enabling counsel to effectively cross-examine witnesses and reconstruct the lineup proce-
dure in court. N. SOBEL, supra note 4, at §§ 2-21 to -24. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
229-38 (1967); Pointer v. State, 380 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1965); Levine & Tapp, supra note 31, at
1081-87, 1124-25; Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, supra note 29, at 399; Note, The State Re-
sponses to Kirby v. United States, supra note 29, at 423. For a discussion on the limited and
ineffective role performed by counsel at lineups, see Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969
(1977).
37. Factors contributing to the suggestive nature of lineups include: the witness' knowledge
that one of the persons in the lineup is the suspect; the intentional contrast of physical characteris-
tics among the participants in the lineup; the witness' familiarity with participants in the lineup;
knowledge possessed by the other participants of who the suspect is; distinctive placement of the
suspect in the line; and distinctive clothing worn by the suspect. Williams & Hammelman, supra
note 31, at 486-90. 4ccord Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (after hearing prosecution's
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permit informed challenges to witnesses in court. 9  In a companion
case, Gilbert v. California,4 ° the Court extended the Wade holding to
state prosecutions.41  The majorities in Wade and in Gilbert, however,
failed to determine the earliest pretrial stage at which the right could
attach.42  Absent such guidance, many state and federal courts con-
strued Wade and Gilbert liberally,43 granting the defendant a right to
evidence, police told victim she was going to see her assailant before she positively identified him);
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (accused placed in lineup where he was only tall man
wearing a hat); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (witnesses communicated with each
other before and during lineup); Saltys v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972) (witness saw photo
of suspect before observing suspect in lineup). The informality of postarrest, pretrial lineup iden-
tifications minimizes the use of procedural safeguards that diminish suggestion. See United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); United States v. Roth, 430 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1021 (1971); Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See generally N. SOBEL,
supra note 4; P. WALL, supra note 31.
38. Scientists have conducted experiments to evaluate the reliability of lineup identifications.
Although performed under favorable conditions, all experiments demonstrated a high degree of
inaccuracy associated with eyewitness identification. See Brown, An Experience in Identification
Testimony, 25 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1935); Chenoweth, Police Training
Investigates the Fallibility of the Eye Witness, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & P.S. 378 (1960);
Vickery & Brooks, Time-Spaced Reporting of a "Crime" Witnessed by College Girls, 29 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & P.S. 371 (1938).
39. Accurate recollection of the custodial lineup at trial would enable the defense to conduct
a "meaningful cross-examination" of the eyewitness, safeguarding defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him. 388 U.S. at 232, 235.
40. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
41. Id at 270. See supra note 33. A second preindictment identification case decided in the
same term was Stbvall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 298 (1967). The Court in Stovall noted that the Wade-
Gilbert decisions could not be applied retroactively and established an alternate due process chal-
lenge. The accused could attack the pretrial lineup on the ground that "the confrontation ... was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was de-
nied due process of law." Id at 301-02. Since Stovall, the Supreme Court has employed the due
process standard to determine whether the pretrial identification procedure used was "so imper-
missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (photograph identification). Accord Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (photographic identification); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973) (same); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (showup); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(police station showup); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (witness confronted the suspect
prior to corporeal lineup); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1968) (photographic identification).
42. Although defendant in Wade was identified during a postindictment lineup, 388 U.S. at
237, the Court did not indicate that counsers assistance could only attach at this stage. Id at 226-
39. Justice Black objected to the majority's equivocal criterion and emphasized that a defendant is
entitled to counsel at identification "regardless of when the identification occurs, in time or place,
and whether before or after indictment or information." 1d at 251 (Black, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
43. See, ag., People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); State v.
Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838 (1968), vacated, Johnson v. Louisiana, 408 U.S. 932 (1972);
Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591,
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counsel at preindictment and preinformation lineups.'
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois45 restricted
the Wade-Gilbert rule46 and limited attachment of the right to counsel
to postindictment custodial lineups.4 7 In a plurality opinion, the Court
held that because any procedure occurring before the "initiation of ad-
versary judicial criminal proceedings"48 was not critical,49 no right to
counsel could then attach. The Court maintained that the fifth amend-
254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Thompson
v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84,
161 S.E.2d 581 (1968), cer. denied, 396 U.S. 934 (1969); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265
N.E.2d 327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
919 (1970); In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970); Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842
(Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P.2d 943 (1969); Hayes v. State, 46
Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970). The California Supreme Court in People v. Fowler
concluded:
IT]he Wade and Gilbert rules are not limited in their application to lineups occurring
after indictment .... The presence or absence of those conditions attendant upon line-
ups which induced the high court to term such proceedings 'a critical stage of the prose-
cution' at which the right to counsel attaches is certainly not dependent upon the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of proceedings formally binding a defendant over for trial.
I Cal. 3d 335, 342, 461 P.2d 643, 648-49, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368-69 (1969).
Several states declined to apply the Wade-Gilbert ruling to preindictment or preinformation
lineups. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d
382 (Fla. 1969); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210
Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
44. Most of the United States circuit courts found no distinction between lineups held before
or after filing an indictment, information, or complaint. These courts held that the right to coun-
sel should attach at either stage. See, eg., Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); Virgin Islands v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (Ist Cir. 1970); United
States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970); United States v.
Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970); United States v. Broadhead, 413
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935
(5th Cir. 1968).
45. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
46. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
47. In the absence of defendant's counsel, witnesses positively identified defendant in a police
station showup before the State filed a complaint or an indictment against him. The Kirby Court
held that Wade and Gilbert did not apply to preindictment confrontations. Thus, the witness's in-
court identification, although it was based on a preindictment showup, was admissible because it
did not violate defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 406 U.S. at 684-87, 690-91.
48. The Court maintained that the "initiation of judicial criminal proceedings.. . is the
starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the gov-
ernment has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government
and defendant have solidified." Id at 689. Accordingly, the Kirby Court held any proceeding that
occurred before filing a formal charge to be antecedent to the initiation of judicial criminal pro-
ceedings.
The dissent in Kirby argued that the Court's distinction between preindictment and postindict-
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ment's due process guarantee5" affords the accused adequate protection
against the risks5' surrounding pretrial confrontations conducted prior
to the formal commencement of prosecution proceedings. 2
ment identification proceedings was irrelevant. Reemphasizing the Wade Court's reasoning, Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, argued that:
Wade did not require the presence of counsel at pretrial confrontations for identification
purposes simply on the basis of an abstract consideration of the words 'criminal prosecu-
tions' in the sixth amendment. Counsel is required at those confrontations because [ofi
'the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestability inherent in the
context of the pretrial identification.'
Id at 696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Grano, supra note 4, at 725-30; Note, The Pretrial
Right to Counsel, supra note 29, at 410-13; Note, The State Responses to Kirby v. United States,
supra note 29, at 432-34.
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977), modified Kirby's holding
that the right to counsel could attach only after filing an indictment or information. In Moore, the
Supreme Court clarified the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings" standard es-
tablished in Kirby by determining that not only the return of an indictment but also the filing of a
complaint marks the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings. Id at 228. In Moore,
the suspect participated in a postcharge, preindictment identification showup without the assist-
ance of counsel. The Court held the identification confrontation unconstitutional. Although the
State had not yet filed a formal indictment, the filing of a complaint was sufficient to commence
judicial criminal proceedings under Illinois law. Id See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111 (1975).
49. 406 U.S. at 690. See supra notes 26 & 32 and accompanying text.
50. The pertinent text of the fifth amendment reads: "No person shall be ... compelled in
any criminal case to be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
In offering the accused the alternative due process safeguard, the Court adhered to the rationale
presented in Stovall v. Denno, 368 U.S. 298 (1967).
51. See supra notes 34-35 & 37-38.
52. The dissent in Kirby contended that the distinction between investigatory procedures oc-
curring before and those occurring after the commencement of adversary proceedings "exalts
form over substance." 406 U.S. at 697-99. The dissent argued that once the accused is in the
custody of the police "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way...
our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences." Id at 698 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966)).
The California Supreme Court also criticized the Kirby preindictment-postindictment
dichotomy:
[W]e think it clear that the establishment of the date of formal accusation as the time
wherein the right to counsel at lineup attaches could only lead to a situation wherein
substantially all lineups would be conducted prior to indictment or information. We
cannot reasonably suppose that the high court.., would announce a rule so susceptible
of emasculation by avoidance.
People v. Fowler, I Cal. 3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (1969).
Opponents of Kirby assert that defendants especially need the assistance of counsel at preindict-
ment identification proceedings. They argue that this is the stage when misidentification, which
could result in the conviction of innocent persons at trial, is most likely to occur. N. SOBEL, supra
note 4, at §§ 2-10 to -11; Williams & Hammelman, supra note 31, at 83.
Police and prosecutors, on the other hand, welcomed the Kirby limitation. They believed that
limiting the scope of the right to counsel to postindictment proceedings would expedite criminal
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A majority of state courts have adopted Kirby,53 using the "com-
mencement of formal judicial proceedings"54 standard as a guideline
for determining when to extend to a defendant his sixth amendment
right to counsel. A few states, 55 however, refuse to conform to the
Supreme Court restriction and continue to apply Wade's critical stage
rationale. 6 These states circumvent the limitation imposed by Kirby
and extend the right to counsel to preindictment custodial lineups by
investigations. See N. SOBEL, supra note 4, at §§2-10 to -11; Comment, The Right to Counsel at
Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 830, 839 (1969).
53. See, eg., State v. Taylor, 109 Ariz. 518, 514 F.2d 439 (1973); State v. Bragg, 371 So. 2d
1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Hunt v. Hopper, 232 Ga. 53, 205 S.E.2d 303 (1974); State v.
Sadler, 95 Idaho 524, 511 P.2d 806 (1973); Winston v. State, 263 Ind. 8, 323 N.E.2d 228 (1975);
Williamson v. State, 201 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1972); State v. Rudolph, 332 So. 2d 806 (La.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); State v. Rowe, 314 A.2d 407 (Me. 1974); Jackson v. State, 17 Md.
App. 167, 300 A.2d 430 (1973); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 363 Mass. 102, 292 N.E.2d 694 (1973);
State v. Carey, 296 Minn. 214, 207 N.W.2d 529 (1973); Hobson v. State, 285 So. 2d 464 (Miss.
1973); Reed v. Warden, 89 Nev. 141, 508 P.2d 2 (1973); Stewart v. State, 509 P.2d 1402 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1973); State v. Delahunt, 401 A.2d 1261 (R.I. 1979); State v. McLeod, 260 S.C. 445,
196 S.E.2d 645 (1973). Missouri and Wisconsin have adhered to Kirby but have criticized its
reasoning. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Taylor, 60 Wis.
2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
The New York Supreme Court articulated specific exceptions to the Kirby holding. See People
v. Banks, 73 A.D.2d 907,424 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1980) (suspect retained counsel on prior charges; right
to counsel on new charges automatically attaches); People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d
819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977) (same). Contra State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 602 P.2d 1344 (1979)
(the right to counsel does not attach to preindictment lineups on new charges when suspect de-
tamined on prior charge); State v. Montgomery, 596 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (same); State
v. Puckett, 46 N.C. App. 719, 266 S.E.2d 48, appeal dismissed, 270 S.E.2d 115 (N.C. 1980) (al-
though defendant in police custody on another charge, absence of counsel at preindictment lineup
on new charge was not unconstitutional per se). In addition, both New York and Alabama grant
the accused the right to the assistance of counsel at a postarrest, preindictment identification if the
accused has already retained counsel. See Sparks v. State, 376 So. 2d 834 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979);
People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974).
54. The Illinois criminal code provides: "When authorized by law, a prosecution may be
commenced by: (a) a complaint, (b) an information, (c) an indictment." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 111-1 (1980).
The documents of indictment and information are commonly used to charge a suspect with a
felony; a complaint is most often used to charge a suspect with a misdemeanor. The type of
charging document employed in particular circumstances will vary and depend upon the criminal
offense and the state. The term "formal charges" generally refers to an indictment, information,
or complaint. A majority of state criminal codes contain provisions similar to those in the Illinois
criminal code.
55. Alaska, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and now California reject the Kirby approach. See in-
fra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. See Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 642 (Alaska 1977); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 339,
217 N.W.2d 22, 27-28 (1974); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 98-99, 634 P.2d 927, 933-34,
177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582-83 (1981); People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 171-72, 205 N.W.2d 461,
467-68 (1973); Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351, 361 (1974) (Eagen, J., concurring).
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broadly interpreting the Kirby definition of "adversary criminal pro-
ceedings"57 or by relying on the state constitutional provisions estab-
lishing the right to counsel.5 8
In People v. Bustamante,59 California became the third state to cir-
cumvent the Kirby v. Illinois restriction and to extend the right to coun-
"sel to preindictment lineups60  by relying on a parallel state
constitutional guarantee.6 t Writing for the majority, Justice Tobriner
initially considered earlier United States Supreme Court decisions for
guidance.62 He noted, however, that California courts are not bound
by these decisions in interpreting provisions of the California
Constitution.63
Justice Tobriner proceeded to apply the critical stage standard, set
forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade,64 to determine
whether the section of the California Constitution that guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to counsel extends to a pretrial lineup. 5
He asserted that because a properly conducted lineup is invaluable in
augmenting the reliability of identification testimony and because mis-
taken identifications substantially influence the outcome of the trial, the
pretrial lineup constitutes a "critical stage" in a criminal proceeding.66
Justice Tobriner held that a fairly conducted lineup is essential to the
protection of innocent defendants67 and that although the defense
counsel plays a limited role during this proceeding, his presence helps
57. The court in Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974), for example, deter-
mined that arrest signaled the commencement ofjudicial proceedings in Pennsylvania. Id at 353.
58. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217
N.W.2d 22 (1974). The Supreme Court of Alaska declared that it "is not limited by decisions of
the United States Supreme Court or by the United States Constitution when interpreting the state
constitution. The Alaska Constitution may have broader safeguards than the minimum federal
standards." 558 P.2d at 641. The Michigan Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning. 391 Mich.
at 337-38, 217 N.W.2d at 27.
59. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981).
60. See supra notes 4 & 31.
61. See supra note 2.
62. Justices Mosk, Newman and Weiner joined in the majority opinion. Justice Tobriner
presented a state constitutional argument similar to that espoused by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977). See supra note 58.
63. 30 Cal. 3d at 97, 634 P.2d at 932, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
64. 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). For a discussion of Wade, see supra notes 30-39 and accompa-
nying text.
65. 30 Cal. 3d at 98-102, 634 P.2d at 933-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 582-85.
66. Id
67. Id at 99, 634 P.2d at 934, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
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to safeguard a defendant's rights.68
After concluding that a defendant's right to counsel extends to pre-
trial lineups, 69 Justice Tobriner considered the question of whether the
right should be limited to postindictment lineups.70 He condemned the
Supreme Court's restriction of the right to counsel to postindictment
proceedings in Kirby as "wholly unrealistic,"'7 I stating that a defendant
frequently requires counsel's assistance prior to the filing of formal
charges.72 Justice Tobriner further maintained that any burden on po-
lice investigations resulting from an extension of the right to counsel to
preindictment lineups is not substantial enough to deny the defendant
this safeguard.73 In support of this contention, he noted that during the
five years between Wade and Kirby, California criminal defendants
were provided with counsel at preindictment lineups with no significant
68. Id Justice Tobriner explained that
[a] requirement for counsel at lineups encourages the police to adopt regulations to en-
sure the fairness of the lineups. . . and to follow those regulations. . . . The attorney
may detect inadvertent suggestive actions not within the scope of prostective regulations.
Finally, counsel's observations will help him to prepare for cross-examination of the
identifying witness and for argument at trial.
Id
69. Id at 100, 634 P.2d at 934-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84. Justice Tobriner contended that
"[slince the presence of counsel can contribute significantly to the protection of his client from
misidentification, defendant is entitled to have counsel present to assist him at that critical junc-
ture." Id
70. Id at 101-02, 634 P.2d at 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85.
71. Id at 100, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
72. Id Justice Tobriner reasoned that limiting the attachment of the right to counsel to pos-
tindictment proceeding as advocated in Kirby would render defendant's right to counsel ineffec-
tive at later stages in the criminal process:
[T]o limit the right to counsel at a lineup to postindictment lineups would as a practical
matter nullify that right. 'The defendant who most needs protection from erroneous
identification is one who is implicated primarily or solely by eyewitness testimony. Yet,
because of this lack of noneyewitness evidence, an identification of the defendant in a
lineup or showup would be necessary to justify formal charges or arraignment. Conse-
quently, the crucial confrontation necessarily will be held before the initiation of formal
judicial proceedings when the defendant can be deprived of counsel. Thus Kirby
removes the protective effects of counsel's presence precisely when the danger of convict-
ing an innocent defendant upon a mistaken identification is greatest. furthermore, after
Kirby, the policy may defeat the aims of Wade and Gilbert in any case simply by delay-
ing formal charges and holding the lineup in the absence of defense counsel.'
Id at 101, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (quoting Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness IdentyFfcation, 29 STAN. L. REV.
969, 996 (1977)). Thus, the majority believed that the formalistic approach of "initiation of adver-
sary judicial proceedings" espoused in Kirby can be easily circumvented by police, effectively
defeating the safeguard of the right to counsel.
73. Id at 101, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
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impediment on police investigations.74 The Bustamante majority con-
cluded that the California Constitution guarantees the criminally ac-
cused the right to assistance of counsel at preindictment custodial
lineups. 75
Writing for the concurrence,76 Chief Justice Bird" disagreed with
the court's observation in dictum that counsel's role at a lineup is "lim-
ited." 78 Rather, she maintained that counsel must assume an active
role at pretrial lineups not only to ensure that proper procedures are
used and to provide effective assistance, but also to protect the constitu-
tional right of the defendant to meaningful cross-examination of wit-
nesses at trial.79
Justice Richardson, the sole dissenter, disapproved of the majority's
"selective reliance" on the state constitution to supersede the limita-
tions established by the United States Supreme Court. 0 He endorsed
74. Id The majority noted, however, that the absence of counsel at a pretrial identification
proceeding would be excusable under exigent circumstances "[ilf conditions require immediate
identification without even minimal delay, or if counsel cannot be present within a reasonable
time, such exigent circumstances will justify proceeding without counsel." Id at 101-02, 634 P.2d
at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (footnote omitted).
75. The court held further that its decision would render the in-court identification testimony
in question inadmissible unless the trial court, on remand, found that the testimony rested on a
"basis independent from and untainted by the improper lineup." Id at 103, 634 P.2d at 936, 177
Cal. Rptr. at 585.
The Bustamante court also considered the retroactive effect of its holding. Recognizing that
prior to Bustamante, police, prosecutors and courts did not extend the right to counsel to pre-
indictment lineups, the court declined to apply the decision retroactively. Moreover, the court
believed that the decision denying retroactive application would avoid disruption of prior investi-
gations and pending prosecutions. Id at 102, 634 P.2d at 936, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978), controlled with.respect to
Bustamante's appeal. Cook held that decisions overruling earlier rulings on criminal procedure
should apply to the individual who raised the procedural issue on appeal. 30 Cal. 3d at 102, 634
P.2d at 936, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
76. Id at 104-06, 634 P.2d at 937-38, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 586-88.
77. Justice Staniforth joined in the concurring opinion. Id
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id at 109, 634 P.2d at 940, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (citing People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting)). Justice Richardson
believed that personal disagreement among a majority of members of a state court is insufficient
reason to reject a United States Supreme Court ruling. He argued that, absent unique or distin-
guishing characteristics of a state case, there is no justification for the state supreme court to
depart from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a constitutional provision that is
virtually identical to the state constitutional provision. 16 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 545 P.2d at 283-84,
127 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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PRETRIAL CUSTODIAL IDENTIFICATION
the rationale set forth by the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois,81 con-
tending that the application of the critical stage test should be restricted
to "criminal prosecutions. ' 82  Justice Richardson also adopted the
Kirby Court's argument that the filing of formal charges signals the
commencement of the adversarial criminal justice process.83 Relying
on Kirby's distinction between the investigation and prosecution stages
of a criminal proceeding, the dissent asserted that lineups conducted
during custodial investigations are not "critical" merely because of
their potential unreliability.84 Justice Richardson reasoned that the
due process standard of the fourteenth amendment affords the accused
adequate protection against abuses of identification procedures.8 5
In addition, Justice Richardson maintained that counsel's role at a
lineup is passive and that such presence does not provide the accused
with absolute protection against mistaken identification or suggestive-
ness.8 6 He argued that an extension of the right to counsel during pre-
indictment lineups would only impose unnecessary burdens and delays
on police investigations 7 and concluded that the majority's rejection of
Kirby was "unnecessary and unwise." 88
The Bustamante Court correctly concluded that counsel's presence at
all pretrial lineups is essential to a complete and effective defense of the
criminally accused. 89 The highly prejudicial impact that an improperly
conducted preindictment lineup could have on a criminally accused at
trial, in terms of both the possibility of mistaken identification 90 and
the deprivation of effective cross-examination, 91 certainly renders this
81. 30 Cal. 3d at 106, 634 P.2d at 938, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
82. Id at 107, 634 P.2d at 938, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
83. Id at 106-07, 634 P.2d at 938, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
84. Id
85. Id at 107-08, 634 P.2d at 939, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 588. Justice Richardson contended that:
any abuse of identification procedures, including improperly suggestive lineups, may be
fully reviewed under applicable due process standards. . . . As stressed by the high
court in Kirby, 'Stovall strikes the appropriate constitutional balance between the right of
a suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures and the interest of society in the
prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime.'
Id
86. Id at 108-09, 634 P.2d at 939-40, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (citations omitted).
87. Justice Tobriner maintained that "harried police personnel busily engaged in an ongoing
investigation are further shackled because they may well be unable accurately to determine
whether or not a true 'exigency' exists." l1d at 108-09, 634 P.2d at 940, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
88. Id at 109, 634 P.2d at 940, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
89. See id at 99-101, 634 P.2d at 934-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
90. See supra notes 34, 37, 38 & 71-72 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 36, 39, 68-69 & 71-72 and accompanying text.
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stage of the criminal prosecution "critical." In People v. Bus/amante
the California Supreme Court recognized that identical risks of mis-
identification and suggestion are present in all custodial lineups,
whether they are conducted before or after the filing of formal
charges.92 As the Bus/amante majority concluded, the imposition of
the Kirby restriction would "exalt form over substance" 93 and effec-
tively deny the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, as well
as his right to counsel.94
The dissent's distinction between investigatory and adversary judi-
cial proceedings, adopted from Kirby v. Illinois,95 suggests that the dan-
gers inherent in pretrial identification procedures96 threaten a
defendant's right to a fair trial only when the identification occurs after
the filing of formal charges.97 Unless the state decides not to prosecute,
however, the effect of an improperly conducted preindictment lineup is
as detrimental to the defendant at trial as is an improperly conducted
postindictment lineup.98 In addition, the due process safeguard advo-
cated in Kirby9 9 and reiterated in Justice Richardson's dissent in Busta-
mante 100 provides an inadequate substitute for the presence of counsel
at a preindictment lineup. Defense counsel's absence during pretrial
identification proceedings renders him unable to make informed chal-
lenges to the credibility and admissibility of the State's identification
evidence at trial.' 0 '
The California Supreme Court's reliance on its state constitution as
an independent source granting the right to counsel represents a valid
exercise of its authority and is not without precedent.'0 2 The Supreme
Courts of Alaska'03 and Michigan,"° for example, have successfully
relied on state constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel to cir-
92. 30 Cal. 3d at 100-01, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
93. Id See supra note 52.
94. 30 Cal. 3d at 100-01, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
95. Id at 106-08, 634 P.2d at 938-39, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
96. Id See supra notes 34-38 & 72 and accompanying text.
97. 30 Cal. 3d at 106-08, 634 P.2d at 938-39, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
98. id at 100-01, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
99. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 36-39 & 68 and accompanying text.





cumvent the Kirby holding."°5
The Kirby holding, advocated in a majority of jurisdictions,1 0 6 ig-
nores the substantial risks of prejudice to a defendant resulting from
improperly conducted preindictment identification procedures.10 7 The
assumption that the dangers inherent in custodial lineups become via-
ble only after the commencement of formal judicial proceedings is
without merit. The presence of counsel during a pretrial lineup--
whether conducted before or after the filing an indictment or com-
plaint-is essential to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.
JA.S.
105. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 34-39, 66-67 & 71-72 and accompanying text.
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